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MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF COMPANIES LISTED IN THE SÃO PAULO 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
Wesley Mendes-da-Silva 
Ervin L. Black* 
 
 
I. SUMMARY 
 
Recently, increased competition has prompted companies to 
enhance their organizational efficiency. One of the areas most 
influenced by this pressure is supply management, which uses a 
large percentage of corporate assets and has the potential to 
negatively affect customer service. Another central area of 
organizational efficiency is corporate governance, which is 
regarded as a determining factor for administrative excellence. 
This paper examines whether the corporate governance 
structures of firms with diversified suppliers differ from those of 
firms with more specialized or concentrated suppliers. This study 
consists of multiple cross sections that cover the period between 
1997 and 2001 and incorporates data collected from 176 industrial 
companies from fourteen industrial segments that listed stocks in 
Bovespa, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. This study based its 
exploration on the premise that minimized inventory and minimized 
days’ sales in inventory ratios define the best-performing supply 
management.1 
The two following propositions summarize the principal results 
of this study. First, increased independence of the chairman of the 
board of directors tends to result in less efficient supply 
management. This conclusion is drawn from the following two 
findings: (i) an independent chairman of the board uses more 
diversified suppliers than an internal chairman and (ii) greater 
 
 
* Wesley Mendes-da-Silva is an assistant professor of the integrated faculty of 
Recife and the Recife Laboratory of Finance at the Federal University of Pernambuco 
in Brazil. Ervin L. Black is an associate professor of the Marriott School of 
Management at Brigham Young University. Special thanks to the three ILMR editors, 
who translated this article from Portuguese into English: Thomas J. Campbell, Nicole 
W. Empie, and Alexander Fuentes. 
1 Number of days it takes to turn over the inventory one time. 
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supplier diversification is directly associated with a larger 
inventory. Second, an independent board of directors correlates 
with less efficient results due to its significant and positive 
association with day’s sales in inventory ratio. These results 
collectively suggest that strategies utilized by independent 
corporate governance structures tend to result in less efficient 
supply management. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 
Undoubtedly, a company’s performance largely depends on the 
executives’ choices in management strategies. In their seminal 
study, Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308–9) discuss the agency 
theory, which examines the relationships between principals (e.g., 
stockholders) and their agents (e.g., executives). Company owners 
have strategic interests in improving the company’s performance. 
However, the decision-making power lies in the hands of the 
executives who are hired by the owners through the advice of the 
directors. According to this view, the following factors determine 
the company’s maximum performance: (i) the technical competence 
of the executives chosen to direct the company’s activities, (ii) the 
alignment of executives’ interests with owners’ interests, and (iii) 
the adequacy of the corporate governance structures responsible for 
balancing the relationship between principals and agents. 
One example of the competing interests at stake here is that of 
the shareholders’ strategic interests, which may lie in choosing to 
diversify the company’s portfolio of suppliers. On the other hand, 
company executives may let their personal needs and desires 
interfere with the task of diversifying suppliers. Aside from the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and executives, 
relationships between the company and its suppliers affect the 
structure of the company’s supply network. When the company 
chooses to work with a small number of suppliers, it tends to have 
more cooperative and long-lasting relationships with its suppliers. 
Conversely, if the company chooses a more diversified supplier 
system, the company will develop short-term relationships based on 
lowest-price competition among suppliers. 
The majority of studies on corporate governance focus on 
economics and finance, concentrating on the impact of governing 
structures on the economic and financial development of 
companies. Consequently, studies on corporate governance in terms 
of supply management are negligible. The recognition that supply 
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management constitutes a significant part of corporate 
management, especially in industrial companies, motivated this 
study. This article fills the performance measurement gap by 
examining the relationship between corporate governance 
structures, supplier diversification strategies, and the supply 
management performance of Brazilian industrial companies. 
The study is comprised from multiple cross sections covering 
the period between 1997 and 2001, including data from 176 
industrial companies from fourteen different industries trading on 
Bovespa, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. This study based its 
exploration on the premise that two factors define the best-
performing supply management: minimized inventory and 
minimized days’ sales in inventory ratio.  
The following sections of this paper more fully explain the 
findings of this study. Section Three presents the theoretical basis 
for the study, including the basic theory of corporate governance 
and a comparison of two different supply management performance 
principles. Section Four then details the methodology employed to 
conduct the study. Section Five discusses the results of the study, 
ending with the conclusions in Section Six. 
 
III. THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE STUDY 
 
A. Corporate Governance 
 
 
In developed countries, agency problems2 result in high costs 
for shareholders. Corporate governance, which is concerned with 
 
 
2  According to many authors, including Bebchuk and Fried (2003), agency 
problems can arise from (i) profit-sharing bonuses, contingency fees, sales 
commissions, merit raises, executive stock options, and various other contractually 
specified methods of setting the amount of the agent’s financial compensation in 
proportion to measurable results; (ii) organizational hiring and promotion policies for 
people in responsible positions (agents) that emphasize identifying and selecting 
candidates whose reputation (based ideally on past performance) indicate they are 
“well-motivated,” “dedicated to the ethics of the profession,” and generally “of good 
character” — i.e., people who feel a strong sense of moral obligation to do their best to 
do what they have promised to do, even when no one is likely watching; (iii) 
institutional arrangements of accountability (such as boards of directors, auditing 
committees, inspector generals’ offices, professional society ethics committees, and 
government regulatory boards) for detecting and then punishing extreme dereliction of 
duty, either by simply firing and disgracing (or perhaps de-licensing) the unworthy 
agent or possibly by aggressively pursuing civil or criminal penalties through the 
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increasing the security of investors’ returns, aims at guaranteeing 
disclosure, accountability, owners’ equity, and compliance with 
local laws. By doing so, corporate governance ameliorates 
problems that result from the separation of ownership and control 
in modern corporations (La Porta et al. 1998). Corporate 
governance oversees the control and monitoring systems 
established by the controlling shareholders so that executives are 
required to make their decisions of resource allocation according to 
shareholder interests. Effective corporate governance requires the 
following: (i) a separation and balance of powers between 
executive officers, the board of directors, and stockholders; (ii) the 
presence of independent members on the board of directors, 
although not all members are required to be independent; and (iii) a 
convergence of interests for controlling shareholders, members of 
the board of directors, and all other members of the company. 
 
B. Supplier Diversification 
 
Studies conducted in Brazil and in other countries have 
indicated that the cost of inventory has a large impact on the 
general costs of production (Gonçalves 2004). In many companies, 
particularly industrial companies, a large percentage of the assets 
consist of inventory. Inventory consists of any quantity of physical 
goods that are conserved, unproductively, for any given time period 
(Moreira 1992, 464). Maintaining inventory means incurring costs, 
such as opportunity costs from the idle capital, potential costs due 
to lost or damaged inventory, and storage and handling costs. On 
the other hand, maintaining inventory allows the company to: (i) 
improve its services through improved responsiveness in the 
delivery process, (ii) increase product availability, (iii) purchase or 
produce lower-cost goods by using economies of scale, and (iv) 
adjust to fluctuations in supply and demand (Moreira 1992; Slack et 
al. 1996; Gaither and Frazier 1998; Chase et al. 1998; Chopra and 
Meindl 2003; Viana 2000; Bowersox and Closs 2001; Ballou 2001, 
249–338). 
Two important hypotheses enhance understanding of the 
strategic purchasing choices that logistics managers make. The first 
                                                                                                          
courts; or (iv) arrangements such as elections whereby the agent’s principals may 
periodically scrutinize the recent performance of the agent and competing candidates 
for the job may make their case for replacing the incumbent agent by revealing his or 
her shortcomings and showing how performance might be improved through a change 
in command. 
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hypothesis postulates that companies should limit the number of 
suppliers (single-sourcing) to establish lasting relationships with 
suppliers, thereby obtaining better supplier performance (Adkins 
and Diller 1983; Reck and Long 1985; Dwyer et al. 1987; Newman 
1988; Rubin and Carter 1990). In an analysis of single-sourcing, 
Swift (1995) reveals that purchasing managers who choose a 
single-sourcing strategy are initially less interested in low prices 
and more interested in the future life of a product. Single-sourcing 
structures ensure a greater ability to make technical support and 
integrity available to the client compared to multiple-sourcing 
structures.  
The second hypothesis suggests that companies should maintain 
a diversified portfolio of suppliers (multiple-sourcing) to stimulate 
competition between the suppliers, thereby obtaining better 
performance for the company (Foster 1992, 38–46; Foster and 
Barks 1990). Historically, purchasing managers have maintained 
two or more active suppliers for each product group to keep costs 
low. The competition among suppliers reduces prices, improves the 
quality of service, and reduces the risk of lack of materials (Monks 
1987). In addition, a diversified supply system provides an 
effective means of controlling suppliers’ behavioral patterns 
(Krause et al. 2000, 33–35; Krause and Scanell 2002, 14). Slack 
summarizes some of the advantages and disadvantages of single-
sourcing vs. multiple-sourcing supply schemes (Slack et al. 1996, 
417). Figure 1 below shows the results. 
 
Figure 1 – Advantages and Disadvantages of Single- and 
Multiple-Sourcing 
 
 Strategy Advantages Disadvantages 
Single-   
Sourcing 
• Better quality inventory 
due to greater availability 
of quality-control systems 
• Stronger and longer-lasting 
relationships 
• Greater dependence results 
in greater commitment and 
effort 
• Better communication 
• Greater cooperation in the 
development of new 
products and services 
• More economies of scale 
• Greater confidentiality 
• Greater vulnerability to 
problems if failures occur in 
the supply source 
• Greater effect of fluctuations 
in demand on individual 
suppliers 
• Greater opportunity for 
suppliers to increase prices 
when no other supplier is 
available 
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 Strategy Advantages Disadvantages 
Multiple- 
Sourcing 
• Greater opportunity for 
buyer to drive prices down 
due to competition among 
suppliers 
• Easier to switch to a 
different supplier in the 
event of failure by another 
supplier 
• Greater knowledge of 
sources and specialization 
• Less opportunity to 
encourage the commitment 
level of the supplier 
• More difficult to develop 
efficient systems for quality 
control 
• Greater effort required for 
communication 
• Less investment on the part 
of the suppliers 
• More difficult to obtain 
economies of scale 
 
According to Chopra and Meindl (2003) and Bowersox and 
Closs (2001), one of the basic objectives of logistics management is 
to minimize the inventory in order to reduce total logistical costs. 
Executives increasingly recognize and appreciate concepts like just 
in time and zero inventory as they try to capture value by reducing 
idle inventories. Chopra and Meindl further maintain that 
executives can reduce inventory by decreasing the costs incurred 
for orders and transportation as well as by implementing discount 
schemes based on total annual volume rather than individual 
purchase quantities. Either scheme, however, is practical to the 
extent that managers maintain good relationships with suppliers. 
Accordingly, one of the principal challenges for inventory 
managers is to reduce the amount of unused inventory without 
jeopardizing the ability to deliver goods to customers promptly.  
However, the goal of reducing inventory is incompatible with 
the goal of diversifying suppliers. Generally speaking, companies 
can achieve cost savings by establishing solid and exclusive 
relationships with a small number of suppliers. Companies need 
suppliers they can trust in order to benefit from functioning with 
lower levels of inventory (Monks 1987, 264). Strategic partnerships 
with suppliers reduce costs as suppliers provide goods that have 
more compatibility with the buyer’s processes and purposes. Cost 
savings materialize with a drop in the number of returns and 
decreases in idle inventory.  
According to Chen and Yang (2002, 60), companies now want 
to reduce the number of their suppliers and establish long-term, 
purchaser-supplier relationships with fewer suppliers for the 
purpose of securing a competitive edge by improving their supply 
efficiency. The principle, known as just in time, involves working 
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with the fewest number of suppliers possible—perhaps as few as 
one supplier for every group of materials—thus allowing managers 
to cultivate long and committed relationships with the suppliers, 
improve the replenishment system, and achieve the consequential 
reduction of expenses incurred for inventory and supplies (Chase et 
al. 1998, 482). Using Brazilian companies, Mendes-da-Silva and 
Pontual (2004) provide evidence that managers need to develop 
lasting relationships with a limited number of suppliers while 
seeking to minimize idle inventory. 
 
C. Corporate Governance and Supply Management 
 
Corporate governance studies have been largely limited to 
analyses of the impact of governance on productivity in industrial 
companies. Köke (2001) analyzes 841 German companies between 
1986 and 1996 and finds evidence that companies with more 
concentrated power structures tend to enjoy higher productivity 
than companies with less concentrated power structures. According 
to Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997), managers in companies 
with highly concentrated ownership work under greater pressure 
and tighter controls. 
Similarly, research conducted by Januszewski, Köke, and 
Winter (2001) deals with the behavioral patterns of 500 German 
companies between 1986 and 1994. In their research, they find 
strong, albeit inconclusive, evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
companies led by the majority shareholder have greater 
productivity, except in cases where the majority shareholder is a 
financial institution. This finding indicates that an independent 
chairman of the board may not ensure the most productive 
governance structure. 
In turn, Destefanis and Sena’s (2004) study explores the 
relation between corporate governance systems adopted by Italian 
industries and their respective technical efficiency. From 1994 to 
1997 they analyzed 3,728 companies from nine industrial sectors. 
Their analysis notes that although quite a few studies on the issue 
have been conducted, the relationship between corporate 
governance and organizations’ technical efficiency is still unclear. 
According to the study, companies with high concentrations of 
ownership benefit from the owners’ significant interest in 
maximizing organizational profits, even though the expropriation of 
minority stockholders is a risk. This study demonstrates that high 
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concentrations of ownership positively affect a company’s technical 
efficiency.  
Studies on the correlations between corporate governance and 
supply management performance are almost non-existent. With this 
in mind, this study seeks to explore what impact, if any, 
independence of the board and the chairman of the board have on 
inventory management patterns. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
A. Sample, Data, and Variables 
 
The sample consists of data from companies from fourteen 
different industrial segments. Table 1 illustrates the frequency of 
each industry. The authors collected data from the Economática® 
Database and the Annual Information Reports (IAN) that the 
companies send to the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM). 
 
Table 1 – Frequency of Participating Companies by  
Economic Sector 
  Source: Created from the research data of the authors (2005). 
 
As of May 2001, 289 of the 459 companies listed on the São 
Paulo Stock Exchange had their data registered on the 
Economática® Database. The authors limited their study to 
manufacturing companies that had available data for at least three 
Sector Frequency Percentage Sector Frequency Percentage 
Chemical 27 15.3 Industrial
Machines
10 5.7 
Textile 26 14.8 Others 10 5.7 
Metallurgy 24 13.6 Paper and
Cellulose
8 4.5 
Vehicles and 
Parts 
18 10.2 Electric 
Energy 
6 3.4 
Food and 
Drinks 
15 8.5 Mining 4 2.3 
Electronics 11 6.3 Petroleum
and Gas 
3 1.7 
Construction 11 6.3 Minerals 
and 
Metals 
3 1.7 
   Total 176 100.0 
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of the five years from 1997 to 2001. As a result, they analyzed a 
total of 176 manufacturing companies with outstanding shares of 
stock. Table 2 describes the calculation of performance variables 
for supply management, corporate governance, and supplier 
diversification. Employing the method recommended by Hair et al. 
(1998), outliers were removed to ensure a normal distribution of the 
data.  
 
Table 2 – Description of Studied Variables 
 
  Variable – Description Conceptual Sources 
lnEstq – Natural log of the inventory value in 
balance sheet of a company i in year t, adjusted 
for inflation. 
Moreira 
(1992); 
Bowersox 
and Closs 
(2001); 
Chopra and 
Meindl 
(2003) 
Hforn♣ – Index of concentration of the three 
main suppliers of company i in year t calculated 
by the equation: 
23
1
100∑
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
×=
i
i
F
fHforn  
Where fi is the value of the purchases carried 
through with a certain supplier and F is the total 
value of purchases by the company i in year t.  
The value of Hforn is maximized when the 
participation of a sole supplier in the purchases of 
the company reaches 100%, and in these terms 
Hforn = 10.000. 
Mendes-da-
Silva and 
Pontual 
(2004); 
Foster 
(1992); 
Newman 
(1989); 
Rubin and 
Carter 
(1990) 
Dependent 
Variables 
Pme♦ – Days’ sales in inventory for company i, 
in year t. It is calculated by the expression 
(Inventory/Cost of Goods Sold) ×  360. 
Moreira 
(1992); 
Bowersox 
and Closs 
(2001); 
Chopra and 
Meindl 
(2003) 
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  Variable – Description Conceptual Sources 
Indpr♣ – A bifurcated variable that expresses the 
independence of the chairman of the board of a 
company. It is assigned a value = 1 if the 
chairman of the board does not simultaneously 
occupy a position as an executive officer 
(independent), and a value = 0 in the alternative 
(not independent).   
Bhagat and 
Black 
(2002) 
Indco♣ – Proxy that measures the degree of 
independence of the board of directors of the 
company. It is expressed by the fraction of total 
members of the board of directors that are 
independent (the percentage of the board that 
does not simultaneously belong to the board of 
directors and hierarchy of executives of the 
company) in year t.  
Bhagat and 
Black 
(2002); 
Dutra and 
Saito (2002) 
 
 
Corporate    
Governance   
Variables 
Hpod♦ – Index of concentration of voting power 
controlled by the three main shareholders. 
Calculated by the following equation: 
23
1
100∑
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
×=
i
i
P
pHpod  
Where pi is the number of common shares of a 
company i controlled by a certain stockholder, 
and P represents the total quantity of common 
shares of the considered company. 
Hoskisson 
et al. (1994) 
 
Control 
Variables  
(VC) 
 
 
 
 
 
Estd♣ – A Politomic variable that expresses the 
Brazilian state where the headquarters of the 
company are installed. Value = 1 if in São Paulo; 
value = 2 if in Minas Gerais; value = 3 if in Santa 
Catarina; value = 4 if in Paraná; value = 5 if in 
Rio Grande do Sul; value = 6 if in Rio de Janeiro; 
value = 7 if in Amazonas; value = 8 if in Mato 
Grosso; value = 9 if in Ceará; value = 10 if in 
Bahia; value = 11 if in Espírito Santo; value = 12 
if in Rio Grande do Norte. 
N/A 
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Sect♦ – A Politomic variable that expresses the 
industrial sector in which the company operates. 
Value = 1 if in metallurgy; value = 2 if in 
chemistry; value = 3 if in electric energy; value = 
4 if in vehicles/parts; value = 5 if in textiles; 
value = 6 if in food/drinks; value = 7 if in 
electronics; value = 8 if in construction; value = 9 
if in industrial machines; value = 10 if in mining; 
value = 11 if in petroleum/gas; value = 12 if in 
nonmetallic minerals; value = 13 if in 
paper/cellulose; value = 14 if in other sectors. 
N/A 
lnTamf♦ – The size of company i expressed by 
the natural log of the total assets of the company 
in year t, adjusted for inflation. 
Bhagat and 
Black 
(2002) 
Ano♣ – Politomic variable that expresses the year 
to which the data referring to company i belongs. 
Value = 1 if it is from 1997; value = 2 if it is 
from 1998; value = 3 if it is from 1999; value = 4 
if it is from 2000; value = 5 if it is from 2001. 
N/A 
 
Control 
Variables  
(VC) 
lnTamc♣ – Natural log of the number of 
members of the board of a company i, in the  
year t. 
Bhagat and 
Black 
(2002) 
Operational source: ♦Economática® data base; ♣IAN/CVM. 
 
B. The Models 
 
The following three hypotheses examine the alleged existence 
of a meaningful relationship between corporate governance, 
supplier diversification strategies, and supply management 
performance of Brazilian industrial companies: 
 
H1: Companies will have better supply management 
performance (as demonstrated by lower inventory values 
(lnEstq) and lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme)) 
when both the chairman of the board (Indpr) and the other 
members of the board (Indco) are independent of the 
company.   
 
H2: The independence of the board (Indco) and the 
independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr) are 
significantly and negatively associated with supplier 
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concentration in the firm (Hforn) due to the conflict of 
interests between stockholders and executives. 
 
H3: Significant association exists between single-sourcing 
(Hforn) and supply management performance. 
 
To test the hypotheses, the authors formulated a multivariate 
regression model for each of the dependent variables. Equations 
(1), (2), and (3) illustrate the models. 
 
Based on the first hypothesis (H1) that companies will have better 
supply management performance (as demonstrated by lower inventory 
values (lnEstq) and lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme)) when 
both the chairman of the board (Indpr) and the other members of the 
board (Indco) are independent of the company; one expects 
coefficients β1 and β2 in equations (1) and (3) to be negative and 
statistically significant. The second hypothesis (H2) posits that the 
independence of the board (Indco) and the independence of the 
chairman of the board (Indpr) are each significantly and negatively 
associated with supplier concentration in the firm (Hforn) and leads 
one to expect that coefficients β1 and β2 in equation (2) should assume 
significant negative values (β1<0; β2<0). The third hypothesis (H3), 
which deals with the relationship between supplier concentration and 
supply management performance, proposes that coefficient β5 should 
be statistically significant in equations (1) and (3). 
The authors selected control variables (CV) 3  to make up for 
possible third-variable effects on the dependent variables (Hforn, 
lnEstq, and Pme) and the independent variables (Indpr, Indco, and 
 
 
3 If the independent control variables have significant correlation with any of the 
variables but do not receive consideration in the proposed models, the relationship 
between variables cannot be accurately verified.   
(1) 
ξψββββββ ∑
=
+++++++=
k
j
jijiiiiii VCHfornHpodTamcIndprIndcoEstq
1
543210 lnln  
(2) 
ξψβββββ ∑
=
++++++=
k
j
jijiiiii VCHpodTamcIndprIndcoHforn
1
43210 ln  
(3) 
ξψββββββ ∑
=
+++++++=
k
j
jijiiiiii VCHfornHpodTamcIndprIndcoPme
1
543210 ln  
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Hpod). The study uses the following control variables: (i) the Brazilian 
state where the company’s headquarters are located (Estd), (ii) the 
industrial sector of the company (Sect), (iii) the size of the firm 
(lnTamf), (iv) the fiscal year to which the information belongs (Ano), 
and (v) the size of the board of directors (lnTamc). Table 2 defines all 
of the other variables. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 shows the absence or presence of correlation between 
the variables. As expected, there seems to be a strong correlation 
between firm size (Tamf) and the following three factors: (i) the 
independence of the board of directors (Indco), (ii) the 
independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr), and (iii) the size 
of the board of directors (Tamc). The industrial sector (Sect) and 
the state where the company is headquartered (Estd) each correlate 
with both inventory values (Estq) and supplier diversification levels 
(Hforn). This expected correlation reflects the differing state 
economies that varied supplier disposition by region. These 
variations by sector create unique, regional, supplier diversification 
strategies and inventory management practices. 
 
Table 3 – Matrix of Correlations between the Variables Studied 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.Estq 1   
2.Pme -.008 1   
3.Hforn -.004 .008 1   
4.Indco .105** .049 -.033 1   
5.Indpr .148** .037 -.128* .563** 1   
6.Tamc .141** -.056 -.080 .335** .292** 1  
7.Hpod -.063 .064 .086 -.146** -.121** -.276** 1  
8.Estd .075* -.023 .105* .030 .044 -.004 -.074* 1  
9.Tamf .849** -.011 .039 .136** .161** .179** -.063 .073* 1  
10.Sect .082* .033 -.170** .022 .058 .097** .003 -.017 .044 1 
11. Ano .032 .031 .022 -.030 -.042 -.015 .098** .000 .003 .000  1 
Source: Created by the authors from the data (2005). 
Notes: **Significance at 1%; *Significance at 5%; N minimum: 386; N Maximum: 
880. 
 
The study used a T-test to verify the existence of meaningful 
difference in the mean values assumed by the dependent variables 
(Estq, Pne, and Hforn) between companies with independent 
chairmen of the board and those without independent chairmen. 
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Before proceeding with the T-test, the equality of the variance 
between these two sets of companies was also tested. According to 
the Levene Test, the hypothesis of the equality of the variances 
could not be rejected at a significance level of 5%. Accordingly, 
both the diversification of the supplier portfolio (t = -2.389; Sig. < 
0.05) and the quantifiable value of the inventory (t = 3.954; Sig. < 
0.05) prove to be significantly different for companies that maintain 
the independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr) as compared 
to those companies that do not. 
 
Table 4 – Calculations from T-test of the Equality of Means as 
Applied to Independence of the Chairman of the Board (Indpr) 
 
Interval of Deviation with 
95% Confidence 
Dependent 
Variables 
t 
statistics
 
Df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed)
Average 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of 
Deviation Low High 
Estq 3.954 700 0.000 191,831.993 48,518.954 96,571.881 287,092.105 
Pme 0.972 352.115 0.331 103.293 106.220 -105.61377 312.200 
Hforn -2.389 342 0.017 - 1,207.168 505.391 -2201.236 -213.100 
Source: Created by the authors using data from the study (2005).  
Note: Statistics software SPSS® 12.0 was used for the treatment of the data. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the results of the multivariate regressions. In 
analyzing the results of the calculated parameters for a multivariate 
regression, Granger and Newbold (1974, 111–20) and Savin and 
White (1977) recommend checking the regression results for the 
presence of spurious regression (first-order autoregressive errors).4 
In this study, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is closer to 2, 
suggesting no autocorrelation.5 
These statistics support the hypothesis that the independence of 
the chairman of the board of directors (Indpr) is significantly and 
 
 
4 If two stationary variables are generated as an independent random series, when 
one of those variables is regressed on the other, the t-ratio on the slope coefficient is 
expected not to be significantly different from zero and the value of R2 is expected to 
be very low. This seems obvious because the variables hold no relation to one another. 
However, if two variables are trending over time, a regression of one on the other 
could have a high R2 even if the two are totally unrelated. Therefore, if standard 
regression techniques are applied, the end result could be a regression that “looks” 
good under standard measures (significant coefficient estimates and a high R2), but 
which really has no value. Such a model would be termed a “spurious regression” 
(Brooks 2002, 367–68). 
5 According to Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1988, 394–95), the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic d indicates the likelihood of autocorrelation. A value of d 
close to 0 indicates positive autocorrelation, a value close to 4 indicates negative 
autocorrelation, and a value around 2 suggests no autocorrelation. 
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negatively associated with the concentration of suppliers (Hforn). 
Therefore, companies with a chairman of the board that is 
independent from its directors generally have greater supplier 
diversification (t = -2.154; Sig < 0.05). However, the independence 
of the board of directors (Indco) is not significantly associated with 
the concentration of suppliers, supporting the rejection of part of 
H2. A third measure of corporate governance, the concentration of 
stockholders’ voting power (Hpod), is positively associated with 
the concentration of the portfolio of suppliers. Therefore, this study 
supports the idea that single-sourcing is significantly associated 
with the independence of the chairman of the board and the 
concentration of stockholders’ voting power. 
 
Table 5 – Calculated Parameters for Multiple Regression 
 
 Dependent  
 Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
(Beta) 
Statistic t 
(R2) [d] 
Sig. 
 LnEstq (Constant) 
Indco 
Indpr 
Lntamc 
Hpod 
Estd 
Lntamf 
Sect 
Ano 
Hforn 
N = 335 
 
( - ) 
( - ) 
 
( - ) 
 
 
 
 
? √ 
 
-0.034 
-0.031 
0.095*** 
-0.004 
-0.037 
0.834*** 
-0.175*** 
0.009 
-0.141*** 
-2.627 
-0.937 
-0.855 
2.706 
-0.114 
-1.237 
24.566 
-5.647 
0.310 
-4.723 
(0.735)[1.403] 
0.009 
0.349 
0.393 
0.007 
0.909 
0.217 
0.000 
0.000 
0.756 
0.000 
 Hforn (Constant) 
Indco 
Indpr 
Lntamc 
Hpod 
Estd 
Lntamf 
Sect 
Ano 
N = 335 
 
( - ) x 
( - ) √ 
 
( + ) 
 
0.074 
-0.143** 
-0.028 
0.097* 
0.057 
0.090 
-0.186*** 
-0.014 
-0.311 
1.100 
-2.154 
-0.441 
1.683 
1.024 
1.459 
-3.320 
-0.268 
(0.067)[1.522] 
0.756 
0.272 
0.032 
0.660 
0.093 
0.306 
0.145 
0.001 
0.789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW           VOLUME 2 
 
 58
 Dependent  
 Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
(Beta) 
Statistic t 
(R2) [d] 
Sig. 
 Pme (Constant) 
Indco 
Indpr 
Lntamc 
Hpod 
Estd 
Lntamf 
Sect 
Ano 
Hforn 
N = 335 
 
( - ) x 
( - ) 
( - ) 
( - ) 
 
0.117* 
0.035 
-0.163** 
0.032 
-0.029 
-0.039 
0.045 
0.040 
0.021 
 
0.438 
1.696 
0.509 
-2.467 
0.530 
-0.504 
-0.618 
0.762 
0.721 
0.371 
(0.046)[2.011]
0.662 
0.091 
0.611 
0.014 
0.596 
0.615 
0.537 
0.447 
 
0.472 
0.711 
Source: Created by the authors based on data from the study (2005). This table 
presents the results of the multiple regression, using each of three dependent variables: 
lnEstq, Hforn, and Pme. Table 2 defines the dependent and independent variables. The 
authors processed the data on the statistics software SPSS® version 12.0; they selected 
the option Enter.   
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; x: hypothesis 
rejected; √: hypothesis not rejected; boldface type: statistically significant variables; 
coefficient of determination (R2): between parentheses; statistic Durbin-Watson [d]: 
between brackets. 
 
Analysis of the size of a company’s inventory (lnEstq) reveals 
that single-sourcing is significantly associated with the size of the 
inventory (t = -4.723; Sig < 0.01). This result corroborates the just 
in time principle that endorses lasting relationships with fewer 
suppliers for more reliable deliveries and improved supply 
management (Gianesi and Corrêa 1996). Therefore, the authors 
cannot reject hypothesis H3 at the significance level of one percent. 
Additionally, the size of the board of directors (lnTamc) and the 
size of the company (lnTamf) are each positively associated with 
the size of the company’s inventory (t = 2.706; Sig < 0.01).  
Only two variables proved to be significantly associated with 
the average days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme). The independence 
of the board of directors (Indco) at the significance level of ten 
percent has a marginally positive association with Pme (t = 1.696; 
Sig < 0.1). The correlation suggests that, generally, the more 
independent the board, the higher the days’ sales in inventory ratio. 
In other words, the study suggests that companies with an 
independent chairman of the board tend to have less efficient 
supply management systems. On the other hand, Indpr 
(independence of the chairman of the board of directors) has no 
significant relation to the average days’ sales in inventory ratio or 
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the size of the inventory. Accordingly, this result half confirms and 
half rejects hypothesis H1 that companies will have better supply 
management performance when both the chairman of the board and 
the board itself are independent of the company. 
The second significant independent variable (the size of the 
board of directors (lnTAMC)) had a negative association with the 
dependent variable Pme. This association suggests that, generally, 
the greater the size of the board of directors, the lower the days’ 
sales in inventory ratio. In other words, companies with larger 
boards of directors have more effective supply management, 
indicated by lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (t = -2.467; Sig < 
0.05). Figure 2 summarizes the results for the three formulated 
hypotheses. 
 
Figure 2 – Summary of the Results of the Study 
 
 
Governance and supplier 
diversification strategy variables 
(independent variables) 
Indco Indpr Hpod Hforn 
 
lnEstq 
    
( - )1% 
 
Hforn 
  
( - )5% 
 
( + )10%
 
 
Strategy and 
supply 
management 
performance 
variables 
(dependent 
variables) 
 
Pme ( + )10%
  
H1: positive association 
between the independence 
of the board of directors 
and supply management 
performance 
 
Negative
 
Negative
  
H2: positive association 
between the independence 
of the board of directors 
and supplier 
diversification 
 
Negative
 
Negative
  
 
 
 
 
Expected 
outcomes  
for the 
hypotheses 
H3: significant association 
between supplier 
diversification and supply 
management performance
    
? 
Note: The sign of the coefficient obtained in the model is enclosed by parentheses. 
The percentage represents the level of statistical significance of the coefficient based 
on the t-statistic. The sign indicated for each hypothesis H1, H2, and H3 reflects the 
originally expected outcome. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Strategic decisions by the highest level of management are 
crucial to a company’s pursuit of superior performance. However, 
executive officers may interfere with a company’s chosen strategies 
by pursuing personal interests at the expense of corporate 
objectives. In order to increase shareholder value, management 
systems should represent corporate interests and not the personal 
interests of the executive officers. 
With such agency problems in mind, this study explores what 
impact, if any, the independence of a chairman has on inventory 
management patterns. This study based its exploration on the 
premise that the best-performing supply management systems are 
defined by two factors: (i) minimized inventory and (ii) minimized 
days’ sales in inventory ratio. Interestingly, this study shows that 
the independence of the chairman of the board of directors is 
positively associated with the size of inventory, whereas the 
independence of the board of directors is positively associated with 
the days’ sales in inventory ratio.   
This study shows that an independent chairman of the board 
uses more diversified suppliers than an internal chairman. 6  It 
further indicates that greater supplier diversification has direct 
association with a larger inventory. 7  Therefore, this study can 
conclude that the independence of a chairman of the board of 
directors tends to result in less efficient supply management. The 
independence of the board of directors also turns out to have a 
negative impact on supply management performance. According to 
the above analysis, the independence of the board of directors is 
significantly and positively associated with the day’s sales in 
inventory ratio.8 In other words, the more independent the board, 
the higher days’ sales in inventory ratio, or the company retains 
idle inventory for a longer period of time. As such, the results 
collectively suggest that the independent corporate governance 
 
 
6 This result may reflect the reality of agency costs since executives who opt to 
maintain a more diversified supplier portfolio most likely attempt to minimize their 
employment risks rather than maximize shareholders’ interests. 
7 However, the independence of the entire board of directors does not have an 
impact on supplier diversification strategies. 
8 It was expected that a more independent board of directors would be associated 
with lower values for the variable Pme (day’s sales in inventory ratio), but the results 
are contrary to the expectation. 
WINTER 2005                                 Brazilian Corporate Governance 
 
 61
structure tends to be associated with less efficient supply 
management. 
Although this study is limited to manufacturing companies 
listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange and only covers a specific 
period of time, which in turn limits its general usage, some aspects 
of the study encourage future research. Future studies may use 
different proxies and time periods from those employed in this 
study. Future studies could also explore the correlations between 
different corporate governance variables and other indicators of 
inventory management performance, such as punctuality and speed. 
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